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In artificial intelligence, one can implement the majority func-
tion using a perceptron with each input weight equal to 1 and the 
perceptron threshold equal to n/2, where n is the number of inputs 
(Russell and Norvig, 2003), again implying little involvement of 
cognitive control.
On the other hand, evidence has shown that cognitive control 
may play a much bigger role in human majority function compu-
tation than what these algorithms would suggest. In a recent study 
we evaluated possible algorithms underlying human performance 
using a computerized MFT (Fan et al., 2008). The participant was 
presented a set of horizontal arrows and had to decide the direc-
tion, left or right, in which the majority of the arrows pointed. 
Three algorithms were considered: exhaustive sequential search 
(sequentially scanning each and every one of the arrows and then 
making a final decision), self-terminating search (examining the 
arrows one-by-one and stopping as soon as a majority decision 
could be made), and grouping search (sampling and re-sampling 
the arrows with a sample size equal to the majority threshold 
until a congruent sample was found). The results showed that the 
grouping search algorithm fit the data best. Since the grouping 
search algorithm required that one determine the congruence 
for each sampled group (i.e., all arrows in the group point in the 
same direction), and in the case of incongruence, choose a dif-
ferent sample, the results indicated the systematic involvement 
of cognitive control.
IntroductIon
Our ability to rapidly process a vast amount of information and 
choose one out of several potential responses depends greatly on 
cognitive control – a mental function for prioritizing information 
processing (Posner and Snyder, 1975; Norman and Shallice, 1986; 
Posner and Rothbart, 1998). The role of cognitive control is most 
clearly manifested in performing various cognitive tasks such as 
the Stroop task and high-level planning. Although recent func-
tional neuroimaging studies have revealed a set of brain regions 
that might be involved in cognitive control, the computational 
mechanisms underlying cognitive control remains debated (Posner 
and Dehaene, 1994; Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Botvinick et al., 
2001; Wang et al., 2010).
The  majority  function  task  (MFT)  is  related  to  a  common 
  cognitive function in which one identifies the category to which the 
majority of items in a given group belong. For example, to answer 
simple questions like “Are there more boys than girls in the play-
ground?” requires the computation of the majority function. While 
it would seem natural to assume that the computation depends 
greatly on cognitive control, the involvement of cognitive control in 
the MFT can be intriguing. On the one hand, algorithms for com-
puting the majority function in computer science often imply little 
relevance of “control” in the process. In Boolean logic, for example, 
a majority function can be computed mechanically by a combina-
tional circuit that output 1 if and only if more than half the inputs 
are 1’s (Cormen et al., 1994). For example, given three input bits x, 
y, and z, the majority can be computed based on the formula,
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Using Leabra (O’Reilly and Munakata, 2000), a biologically real-
istic connectionist modeling framework, we have developed two 
neural network models. The two models are similar in that both 
involve the same set of neural modules representing task-relevant 
brain functions, share the same network connections, and are able 
to perform the task. However, by varying a single parameter, we 
show that they implement different algorithms that hold distinct 
implications for cognitive control. The modeling results show that 
they fit the human data differently, highlighting the critical role of 
cognitive control in the MFT.
MaterIals and Methods
the MajorIty functIon task
The MFT described in Fan et al. (2008) was a computerized task in 
which participants were presented with a set of horizontal arrows and 
had to decide the direction (left or right) that the majority of arrows 
pointed. In each trial, the arrow set was presented simultaneously, 
at locations randomly selected from eight possible ones arranged as 
an octagon centered on a fixation cross (see Figure 1). The set was 
shown for 2500 ms and participants were required to make a response 
by pressing one of the two keys as quickly and accurately as possible. 
Responses made within the 2500 ms window terminated the display of 
the arrow set, which was then followed by a variable fixation period of 
2000–3000 ms, prompting participants to prepare for the next trial.
The possible set sizes were 1, 3, and 5, so that the majority judg-
ment was always unambiguous (the majority thresholds are 1, 2, 
and 3, respectively). Trials were blocked by set size. Different arrow 
composition conditions could be distinguished for blocks with set 
sizes of 1, 3, and 5. For set size 1, the majority was the same as the 
sole arrow itself (1:0). For set size 3, it was possible that two arrows 
pointed to the same direction (2:1) or all three arrows pointed to the 
same direction (3:0). Similarly, for set size 5, one could distinguish 
three composition conditions, 3:2, 4:1, and 5:0.
This experiment design allowed us to evaluate possible algorithms 
underlying human performance in the MFT (Fan et al., 2008). We 
started by analyzing the amount of information that the participant 
had to process in each condition before a decision could be made. 
We noticed that for any given stimulus display, different algorithms 
resulted in different amounts of information to be processed. Take the 
case of set size 3 as an example. A straightforward exhaustive search 
algorithm would require the participant to scan all three arrows before 
making the judgment. Assuming that each arrow scan processed 1 bit 
of information, this implied that the exhaustive search algorithm had 
to process 3 bits of information for set size 3, regardless of the arrow 
composition (2:1 or 3:0). This is different from the self-terminating 
search algorithm, according to which search stopped as soon as the 
majority could be decided upon (i.e., the number of same-direction 
arrows examined was equal to the respective majority threshold). 
Therefore, in the case of 3:0, only two arrow scans were necessary. In 
the cases of 2:1, the best scenario was two scans and the worst scenario 
was three scans. Because the probability of the best scenario was 1/3 
in the experiment and the probability of the worst scenario was 2/3, 
the weighted average number of arrow scans in the case of 2:1 was 2 
2/3. Finally, a grouping search algorithm was also possible. Based on 
this algorithm, a person could randomly select a sample of arrows 
(whose size was equal to the necessary majority size, two for set size 3 
and three for set size 5) and check if they were congruent (i.e., point-
ing in the same direction) – a response could be made if the sample 
was congruent and a re-sampling was needed if it was not. Statistically 
the number of samples needed for a response (i.e., the first congruent 
sample, a success) follows a geometric distribution and the average is 
1/p, where p is the probability of success. In the case of 2:1, for example, 
p is 1/3 and the average number of samples needed is 3. The average 
number of samples needed multiplied by the number of arrow in each 
sample leads to the average number of arrow scans in each condition. 
We then transformed these arrow scans to information measures in 
bits by taking the base 2 logarithm of the number of scans.
Assuming that the amount of information to be processed directly 
correlates with human performance (Hick, 1952; Hyman, 1953), we 
examined the mean human RT data as a function of the amount 
of information to be processed in different conditions (Fan et al., 
2008). The exhaustive search algorithm was immediately ruled out 
because it did not fit the human data at all. For self-terminating 
search and grouping search, we noticed that while both algorithms 
could fit the human data, there was one major discrepancy with the 
self-terminating search – while the algorithm predicted that the 2:1 
condition involved less information to-be-processed than the 5:0 
condition (2 2/3 vs 3 bits, respectively), the human data revealed 
  significantly longer RT in the 2:1 condition than in the 5:0 condition. 
Overall, the behavioral results supported the notion that humans 
tended to use the grouping search   algorithm in the MFT.
Figure 1 | The majority function task (MFT). In this task, arrows with set 
size 1, 3, and 5 are randomly presented at eight possible locations arranged as 
an octagon centered on a fixation cross. The arrows point either left or right and 
are presented simultaneously. The participants’ task is to indicate the direction 
in which the majority of arrows point. For example, if three arrows are 
presented, and two point to the left and one to the right (see the “2:1” panel in 
the “set size 3” column), the correct response should be “left” . The eight circles 
are for illustration of the locations and are not displayed during the experiment. 
Different arrow composition conditions are shown for each set size.
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unique features. For example, Leabra neurons use an activation 
function that models the known electrophysiology of real neurons 
closely while keeping the computation tractable. The connections 
among neurons in Leabra cannot freely change signs (i.e., chang-
ing from an excitatory link to an inhibitory link, and vice versa), 
which is allowed in earlier artificial neural network systems and 
has been shown to be biologically unrealistic. In addition, as a 
coherently integrated framework, Leabra allows different informa-
tion transformation mechanisms and different learning algorithms 
(Hebbian learning, competitive learning, and error-driven learn-
ing) to simultaneously occur and interact. As a result, it is now 
possible to build deeper hierarchies of neural networks to simulate 
complex   cognitive systems.
Brain networks
The networks in our models include not only the common regions 
for visual information processing such as V1 and V4 but also regions 
specifically selected based on recent cognitive neuroscience studies 
with similar information processing components as in the MFT. 
For example, an fMRI study on perceiving patterns in random 
sequences, similar to the serial-choice RT tasks used in early infor-
mation theory studies, showed that violations of repeating patterns 
evoked activation in the prefrontal cortex, posterior rostral ACC, 
fronto-insular cortex, and basal ganglia (Huettel et al., 2002). RT 
and the amplitude of the hemodynamic response in these regions 
are associated with the length of the sequence before the violation. 
In another fMRI study, participants were presented with cue cards 
and asked to make a two-choice response to predict whether the 
next card would be higher or lower. Greater activation in the ACC 
and fronto-insular cortex was associated with higher uncertainty 
(Critchley et al., 2001). These regions have also been shown to be 
involved in conflict processing between possible responses (Nee 
et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2010). In addition, the lateral prefrontal 
cortex (LPFC) and posterior parietal cortex near/along the intra-
parietal sulcus (IPS) have been shown to be related to information 
processing evoked by the occurrence of a high information event 
(Strange et al., 2005; Yoshida and Ishii, 2006) and modulate the 
activity of early visual areas (Rossi et al., 2009). Finally, partially 
due to the functional similarity between IPS and frontal eye fields 
(FEF), we did not include the FEF in our models.
Model structure
These task-relevant brain regions were simulated in our models 
by layers (see Figure 2). In particular, each model contains seven 
layers with five having names roughly corresponding to those to-
be-simulated brain regions. Each layer contains a certain number 
of neuron units, each of which does not literally correspond to a 
biological neuron per se but should be treated as a summary of a 
population of neurons for a specific function. The layers, described 
below, are connected in a biologically plausible way to form a 
network, similar to a previous model we built for simulation of 
attentional networks (Wang and Fan, 2007).
(1)  The Input layer has 16 units with an 8 × 2 configuration. 
Each row of units represents one location (so there are eight 
possible locations). The two units in the same row   represent 
coMputatIonal Models of the MajorIty functIon task
One possible explanation for the Fan et al. (2008) results is that 
the task requirements of the MFT encourage a grouping search 
algorithm. When a majority judgment is needed as soon as pos-
sible, one may take a betting strategy and choose to look at sev-
eral items at the same time (e.g., subitizing), especially if the 
necessary sample size is not too large (as in the current MFT 
setup) and a successful sample can quickly lead to a response. 
Sequential-scanning based algorithms (either exhaustive or self-
terminating), despite their simplicity, involve extra operations 
such as counting and remembering (e.g., “how many right arrows 
have been counted?”).
To further evaluate the plausibility of a grouping search algo-
rithm in the MFT, it is important to examine how the mental 
operations subserving the grouping search might be instantiated 
in the brain. For example, one requirement for the grouping search 
strategy is a mechanism of grouping. A large body of literature 
in visual search has supported the notion of perceptual group-
ing (Treisman, 1982) and multi-object tracking (Pylyshyn, 2000, 
2001). For example, it has been shown that human vision is capable 
of tracking multiple (usually less than 4) objects simultaneously 
(Pylyshyn, 2000, 2001). It is likely that similar mechanisms are used 
in the MFT to support grouping.
An even more important requirement for the grouping strategy 
is cognitive control, a mental function that is especially critical 
when the amount of information to be processed is overwhelming, 
or in the presence of salient distracters as in classical tasks such 
as the flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974) and the Stroop 
color–word interference task (Stroop, 1935). Recent advances in 
human attention research have shown that cognitive control is an 
essential aspect of attention and is subserved by distinct networks 
in the brain, including areas in the prefrontal cortex and anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC; Posner and Raichle, 1994; Miller, 2000; Fan 
et al., 2002; Posner, 2004; Roelofs et al., 2006). Since the group-
ing search strategy requires a judgment of group congruence, the 
involvement of cognitive control would be warranted. This is dif-
ferent from the sequential-scanning based algorithms, where the 
requirement for cognitive control is minimal. Therefore, analyses 
of the MFT performance directly lead to testable hypotheses of 
specific mental operations and neural correlates underlying the 
task performance.
Both issues can be addressed to a certain extent by developing 
and comparing computational models of human behavior in the 
MFT that implement different algorithms. Two such models were 
developed in this study, one for grouping search and the other for 
self-terminating search. By comparing the two models we show that 
the two models required different involvement of cognitive control 
and fitted human data differently. We argue that the models reveal 
a plausible way of cognitive control instantiation in the brain that 
underlies human performance in the MFT.
results
General Model descrIptIon
The models were developed in the connectionist modeling frame-
work of Leabra (for local, error-driven and associative, biologi-
cally realistic algorithm; O’Reilly, 1998; O’Reilly and Munakata, 
2000). In contrast to other connectionist modeling frameworks, 
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ment grouping (setting k of V4 to be 1, 2, or 3, depending 
on the condition) or a singleton selection (setting k of V4 
to be 1).
(4)  The V4 layer sends its output to the Output layer, which 
contains  two  units,  representing  the  “left”  and  “right” 
response, respectively. Specifically, the “left” unit only con-
nects to the eight units in the left columns of V4, and the 
“right” unit only connects to the eight units in the right 
columns of V4. The Output layer’s k is set to 1 to indicate 
that only one response is desired at a time. The firing thre-
shold of the Output unit is set in such a way that normally 
it fires only when the number of active units with the same 
sidedness in V4 reaches the majority threshold. For exam-
ple, in the five-arrow condition, at least three units in the 
left column of V4 have to fire in order for the left Output 
unit to fire. As soon as an Output unit fires the network 
halts, indicating that a majority decision has been made. 
The number of running cycles it takes for the network to 
get to this point is a measure of the model response time 
(O’Reilly and Munakata, 2000). We do not commit the 
Output layer to any specific region in the brain other than 
saying that it summarizes the information in the V4 layer 
and makes responses.
(5)  The V4 layer also sends its output to the ACC layer, which 
then has a bidirectional connection with the LPFC layer. The 
purpose of these two layers is to monitor the activated units 
in V4 and detect incongruence (arrows pointing in different 
directions), if any, and therefore, simulate the function of 
cognitive control in the MFT. The ACC contains two units. 
The way it connects to the V4 layer is the same as the Output 
layer. However its k is set to 2 and no special firing threshold 
is set. The consequence of these settings is that an ACC unit 
fires whenever there is an activated unit in the correspon-
ding column of V4. The ACC layer sends its output to the 
LPFC layer, which contains only one unit. The LPFC unit’s 
firing threshold is set in such a way that it typically fires only 
when both ACC units fire – suggesting that there are both 
left-pointed and right-pointed arrows in V4. Therefore, the 
LPFC layer detects incongruence by summarizing the infor-
mation computed in the ACC layer.
(6)  The IPS layer is specialized for spatial information processing 
and simulates the “where” pathway and the orienting atten-
tional networks in the brain. It contains eight units organized 
in a column, representing the eight possible spatial locations 
where arrows can appear. The IPS layer sends its output to 
the V4 layer to enhance the processing of the corresponding 
V4 units. There are three sources from which the IPS layer 
receives input. First, it receives bottom-up input from the 
V1 layer. The connection from V1 to IPS is location-based, 
with two V1 units in each row connecting to the IPS unit in 
the corresponding row. Second, the IPS layer receives lateral 
input from (and sends output to) the V4 layer. The connec-
tion is again location-based, in a row-by-row fashion. Finally, 
the IPS layer receives top-down input from the LPFC layer, 
critical for the re-sampling function required in the grouping 
search model described later.
left-pointing  and  right-pointing  arrows,  respectively. 
Figure 2, for example, shows that there are two left-pointing 
arrows and three right-pointing arrows that are presented.
(2)  The V1 layer has the same configuration as that of the Input 
layer. It copies activations from the Input layer through a 
one-to-one projection (i.e., only corresponding units in the 
two layers are connected). Therefore it serves mainly as a pla-
ceholder for the information from the Input and does not 
literally correspond to the primary visual cortex.
(3)  The V4 layer performs basic visual information processing 
and simulates the object selection and recognition networks 
in the brain. It has the same configuration as that of the V1 
layer and connects from the V1 layer in a similar one-to-one 
projection. One critical difference is that the V4 layer per-
forms a sampling/selective function on its V1 inputs. That is, 
it is possible that not all the units with active inputs from V1 
actually fire in V4. In the five-arrow condition, for example, 
while there will be five units activated in V1 only a subset (1, 
2, or 3) of those corresponding units in V4 may fire. This is 
implemented through a built-in mechanism in Leabra cal-
led k-winners-take-all (kWTA), which allows only a selected 
few, determined by the k setting, highest activated units in a 
layer to actually fire. Due to the noise in connection weights, 
the selecting processing can be stochastic. As will be shown 
Figure 2 | A snapshot of the model structure. Each layer simulates a brain 
region designated by the layer name. The five active units (yellow) in Input 
represent the five arrow stimuli presented in a trial.
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The essence of the grouping search model has to do with its ability 
to sample and re-sample the presented arrows with a given sample 
size. This is mainly realized via setting k in the V4 and IPS layers 
to be equal to the respective majority threshold in each condition. 
Therefore the model would select a group of k arrows (in V4) ini-
tially. If these k arrows happen to all point in the same direction 
(congruent), a response is made and the trial is over. Otherwise a 
new group of k arrows is selected and the searching continues.
We use Figure 3, showing the snapshots of the working model at 
two specific running cycles (left and right, respectively) in a given 
3:2 trial, to describe how the grouping search model works. It is clear 
from the Input layer in Figure 3 that three left-pointing arrows and 
two right-pointing arrows are presented. Since this is in a five-arrow 
condition, the k of the V4 layer is set to be 3, the majority threshold. 
Figure 3A shows that at that particular moment (cycle 72) three 
arrows, one left-pointing and two right-pointing ones, are selected 
in V4. Of course this sample is not adequate to lead to a response – 
the right Output unit is preferred but not strong enough to reach 
the decision threshold. Therefore a re-sampling is necessary, which 
is implemented through the ACC–LPFC–IPS–V4 loop.
Specifically, in Figure 3A both units in ACC are activated, suggest-
ing, correctly, that the selected sample contains both left-pointing 
and right-pointing arrows. This information is summarized by the 
firing of the LPFC unit, indicating incongruence has been detected. 
The IPS layer is notified of this incongruence through the LPFC–IPS 
connection, which leads to the higher activation in the IPS layer. As 
a result, the IPS units’ accommodation channels are turned on (by 
setting the units’ accommodation specification to true, a standard 
feature in Leabra). The effect of accommodation is that those units 
that have been active for a certain time are depressed so that units 
who lost the initial kWTA competition may have a chance to win and 
fire – a natural re-sampling. Note that since accommodation always 
punishes active units and rewards inactive units the re-sampling 
is not a random sampling in a strict sense. The re-sampling result 
in IPS is conveyed to the V4 layer through the bidirectional link 
between IPS and V4 so that re-sampling can also occur in V4 fol-
lowing the lead from the IPS layer. As shown in Figure 3B, at cycle 
106 the two original quiet IPS units are activated (and the three 
originally activated IPS units accommodate), indicating two new 
arrow locations are selected. This location information is passed to 
the V4 layer, making the arrows in those locations relatively more 
active. The net result in this case is that more left-column units are 
activated, leading to the switch of preference in the Output layer. At 
cycle 114 the left Output unit finally reaches the response threshold 
and the model halts with a response.
Modeling results
For each trial, the model RT is measured by the number of cycles 
that the model takes to reach the majority decision. In the group-
ing search theoretically the number of cycles is determined by the 
number of samples (size k) scanned, which is determined by the 
configuration of stimulus set (e.g., 3:2 vs 5:0).
We ran the grouping search model 24 times to simulate 24 sub-
jects, with each subject performing 12 trials of each task condition. 
The model was initialized (including both unit activations and con-
nection weights) for each trial to induce necessary randomness and 
Model settings
The model uses most of Leabra’s default variable settings with 
a few task-specific changes summarized in Table 1. The settings 
can be classified into two categories. First, most of these settings 
(shown in regular font in Table 1) are tuned based on task-specific 
  requirements – they are set that way so that the network is capable 
of performing the task in the first place. Consequentially they are set 
prior to the actual simulation and remain fixed in all experimental 
conditions. They are, therefore, not responsible for the main effects 
we intend to study (see Figure 4). Examples in this category include: 
(1) the accommodation time constant for integration in layers IPS 
and Output – a 0.02 setting makes accommodation in these layers 
a little faster so that a re-sampling can occur in a timely manner if 
necessary; (2) the activation threshold for units in the LPFC layer. 
This setting was to make sure that LPFC is fired when both ACC 
neurons are active; (3) all connection weights in the network were 
drawn from a uniform distribution with mean at 0.7 and variance 
at 0.1. The relative projection weight-scale between layers IPS and 
V4 was set to 0.5 to allow stronger bottom-up influence to avoid 
phantom activation in these layers (e.g., a right V4 neuron fires at 
a location where no arrow is presented in the input).
Second, there are a few settings (shown in bold in Table 1) that 
are set based on each experimental condition and therefore are 
directly related to the main effects in Figure 4. They include the 
k setting in the V4 and IPS layers (3, 2, and 1 for conditions of set 
size 5, 3, and 1, respectively) and the activation threshold in the 
Output layer (0.8, 0.47, and 0.25 for conditions of set size 5, 3, 
and 1, respectively). Since each condition is presented in separate 
blocks (both in the behavioral study (Fan et al., 2008) and in our 
simulation), the k settings are set at the beginning of each block to 
designate subjects’ simple and necessary adjustment prior to that 
block (e.g., “Now each trial will contain five arrows, so I need to find 
three same-direction arrows as the majority”). To a certain extent 
the only “parameter” we tune to fit the data patterns in Figure 4 is 
the activation threshold in the Output layer, as it is systematically 
changed depending on the set size.
Table 1 | Model settings (all variable settings remain fixed in all 
experimental conditions except those shown in bold).
Object name  Variable name  Value
Layer V4  kWTA.k  3, 2, or 1 
    (for set size 5, 3, 1)
Layer IPS  kWTA.k  3, 2, or 1 
    (for set size 5, 3, 1)
  Accommodation.d_bt  0.02
Layer Output  kWTA.k 1
  Accommodation.d_bt  0.02
  Neuron act threshold  0.8, 0.47, 0.25 
    (for set size 5, 3, 1)
Layer LPFC  Neuron act threshold  0.65
All connections  Weight  Uniform distribution  
   ( m = 0.7 , variance = 0.1)
The bidirectional  Relative weight_scale  0.5 
projection 
between IPS and V4
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Structurally, the self-terminating search model is exactly same 
as the grouping search model. The main difference between the 
two models has to do with the k setting of layers V4 and IPS. 
Instead of fixing it to be the respective majority threshold in 
each condition (e.g., three in the five-arrow condition) as in the 
grouping search model, in the self-terminating model we set it 
to be 1 initially and gradually increase it (by 1 at a time) until a 
response can be made (i.e., when the number of active units with 
the same sidedness in V4 reaches the majority, three in the five-
arrow condition, which then causes the corresponding Output 
unit to fire). This change leads to a self-terminating serial search 
in that the model essentially scans the presented arrows one-by-
one and responds as soon as one Output unit reaches the firing 
threshold. In addition, by gradually increasing k rather than fixing 
it to be 1, the model basically selects a new arrow to scan at a time 
and keeps all those already scanned arrows actively represented 
in V4, thus emulating the counting component in a sequential-
scanning based algorithm.
noise. Table 2 shows the modeling results. For ease of comparison we 
also list the empirical results reported in Fan et al. (2008). A visual 
inspection reveals that the modeling results, in both RTs (in cycles) 
and accuracies, show similar patterns as the empirical results. A 
mixed-effect linear model analysis shows that the mean RTs for the 
three set sizes (23.2 cycles, 53.8 cycles, and 88.6 cycles) were sig-
nificantly different, F(1,140) = 46.24, p < 0.01. In set size 3, the RTs 
under the two conditions (2:1 and 3:0) were significantly different, 
F(1,44) = 313.87, p < 0.01. In set size 5, the RTs under the three condi-
tions (3:2, 4:1, and 5:0) were significantly different, F(2,66) = 63.27, 
p < 0.01. More importantly, the RT in the 2:1 condition was signifi-
cantly longer than the RT in the 5:0 condition, t(23) = 15.16, p < 0.01, 
consistent with the behavioral results in Fan et al. (2008).
To further examine the model fit, we plot the mean modeling 
RTs (in cycles) as a function of task conditions, together with the 
empirical data from Fan et al. (2008), shown in Figure 4. It is clear 
that the model captures the main variance among task conditions. 
A linear regression of empirical RTs on modeling RTs reveals a R2 
of 0.95 [F(1,4) = 81.40, p < 0.01].
Table 2 | The modeling results.
Set  Stimulus  Composition  rT (cycle)  Accuracy (%)
size
 
condition
 
condition
  Mean  SD  Mean SDa  Mean  SD
1  0,1  1:0  23.21 [44.89] (520)  0.45 [1.78] (77)  1.27 [6.43] (107)  100.00 [100.00] (99.5)  0.00 [0.00] (0.9)
3  000,111  3:0  36.91 [65.68] (647)  1.38 [2.08] (110)  5.21 [6.24] (142)  99.93 [100.00] (100.0)  0.34 [0.00] (0.0)
  001,011  2:1  70.76 [74.11] (1121)  4.38 [3.33] (153)  33.59 [10.84] (309)  81.94 [98.61] (97 .5)  6.19 [2.59] (3.9)
5  00000,11111  5:0  57 .73 [83.31] (724)  1.29 [3.87] (130)  2.70 [7 .10] (174)  100.00 [100.00] (99.8)  0.00 [0.00] (0.9)
  00001,01111  4:1  83.58 [91.08] (1261)  9.20 [2.36] (192)  51.88 [9.12] (349)  96.60 [99.42] (98.6)  3.24 [1.41] (2.4)
  00011,00111  3:2  124.12 [99.65] (1615)  16.73 [3.60] (203)  99.69 [12.82] (392)  72.29 [94.44] (85.2)  5.53 [4.91] (6.7)
The data shown in brackets are modeling results based on the self-terminating search model; the data shown in parentheses are empirical results (in milliseconds 
for RT) reported in Fan et al. (2008). Accuracy is calculated by treating all trials with running cycles larger than 600 as wrong. Wrong trials were excluded from the 
RT calculation.
aMean of SDs across subjects.
AB
Figure 3 | Traces of the grouping search model running in a trial with three left-pointing and two right-pointing arrows, at two different time points: cycle 
72 (A) and cycle 106 (B). The number in each unit is its activation, also represented by color.
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Wang et al.  Cognitive control in majority searchsignificantly different, F(1,140) = 276.53, p < 0.01. In set size 3, 
the RTs under the two conditions (2:1 and 3:0) were significantly 
different, F(1,44) = 36.28, p < 0.01. In set size 5, the RTs under 
the three conditions (3:2, 4:1, and 5:0) were significantly different, 
F(2,66) = 31.45, p < 0.01. Most importantly, the modeling RT in 
the 2:1 condition was significantly shorter than the modeling RT 
in the 5:0 condition, t(23) = −12.69, p < 0.01. This is inconsist-
ent with the human behavioral results but consistent with what 
the self-terminating search algorithm predicts (Fan et al., 2008). 
A linear regression of empirical RTs on model RTs reveals a R2 of 
0.70 [F(1,4) = 9.30, p > 0.03], worse than the fit of the grouping 
search model.
dIscussIon
Cognitive control refers to processes that flexibly and adaptively 
allocate mental resources to permit selection of thoughts and 
actions directed by our intentions and goals under a certain context 
(Posner and Snyder, 1975; Miller, 2000; Badre, 2008; Kouneiher 
et al., 2009; Solomon et al., 2009), and has been implicated in 
a  range  of  cognitive  tasks  involving  attention,  learning,  and 
  decision-making. Although the relationship between the activ-
ity of the frontoparietocingulate system and cognitive control 
has been consistently demonstrated in functional neuroimaging 
studies, the underlying computational mechanisms and dynam-
ics of how these brain regions work together to implement the 
function of cognitive control remains unclear. The present study 
investigates the instantiation of cognition control by developing 
biologically realistic neural network models to perform a simple 
MFT, with the intention that the results can be extended to explain 
the computational underpinnings of cognitive control in other 
more complex tasks.
Search for the majority of a given item set is a common task and 
it is surprising that few studies have been conducted to understand 
how people perform the task. One reason may have to do with the 
The mechanism for dynamically increasing the parameter k is 
implemented via a Leabra script, which in every running cycle 
monitors the number of currently active units in V4. If this number 
is less than the total number of arrows presented (i.e., not all 
arrows have been scanned) and the model has not yet responded, 
k is increased by 1. Note that the model responds as soon as one 
Output unit reaches the firing threshold – there is no requirement 
that a crucial number of arrows have to be scanned. In addition, 
the model leaves the ACC–LPFC–IPS habituation loop intact so 
conflict detection and re-sampling can still occur as in the group-
ing model. However, given the dominant effect of k increment 
these networks do not play a significant role in determining the 
model performance.
To demonstrate how the self-terminating model works, we 
again show the running trace of the model in a given 3:2 trial (see 
Figure 5). It shows that at cycle 40 only one right-pointing arrow 
(in V4) was detected (Figure 5A), at cycle 61 another left-pointing 
arrow were detected (Figure 5B), at cycle 76 an additional left-
pointing arrow was detected (Figure 5C), and finally at cycle 90, 
another left arrow had been detected (Figure 5D). Given that at 
this moment three left-pointing arrows had been detected, the 
model then terminated with a left response, and the k setting 
of the V4 and IPS layers had now been increased to 4. The final 
RT measure was the number of cycles that it took for an Output 
node to fire.
Modeling results
We again ran 24 simulated subjects with the model and the mod-
eling results are shown in Table 2 and Figure 4, together with the 
grouping search model results and the data from human subjects. 
A  visual  inspection  shows  that  a  mismatch  between  the  self-
  terminating search model results and the human data is evident. 
A mixed-effect linear model analysis shows that the mean RTs for 
the three set sizes (44.9 cycles, 69.9 cycles, and 91.4 cycles) were 
Figure 4 | Computational modeling results (in cycles) as a function of task conditions, together with the empirical data (in milliseconds) reported in Fan 
et al. (2008).
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tion, the memory requirement (i.e., how many items in a given 
category have already been found) is greatly magnified in the MFT. 
As a result, in order to perform the task in a more efficient way, 
decisions of where to search next (which may not involve over eye 
movements) and when to make the response are critical, making a 
guided search a   possibility (Niwa and Ditterich, 2008). However, to 
what degree such decisions depend on cognitive control has been 
unclear (Gray et al., 2006).
The grouping search algorithm makes distinctive claims regard-
ing the involvement of cognitive control in the task than other 
more straightforward algorithms such as the self-  terminating 
search. Based on the grouping search algorithm, for every selected 
group a judgment of group congruence has to be made, and in 
the case of incongruence a different group has to be selected and 
examined. Therefore, the algorithm implies the heavy and con-
tinuous involvement of cognitive control for conflict detection 
and re-sampling. This is different from those sequential-scanning 
fact that it can be easily done algorithmically, often via designed cir-
cuits or built-in functions. In statistics, the majority function is asso-
ciated with mode, a statistic representing the value that occurs the 
most frequently in a data set, which is often readily shown by histo-
grams. Fan et al. (2008) have developed a task to study how humans 
perform the majority function in a well-controlled environment. 
A careful analysis of the computational load required by different 
algorithms suggests that instead of using intuitive search strategies 
such as exhaustive search or self-terminating search, humans may 
adopt a grouping search algorithm, which involves sampling and 
re-sampling the item set with a majority-determining size.
It is important to note that the majority search, even in the 
context of MFT, is clearly relevant to ordinary visual search, on 
which a large body of research has been conducted (Treisman, 1982; 
Wolfe et al., 1989; Grossberg et al., 1994; Pylyshyn, 1994; Najemnik 
and Geisler, 2005). One might speculate that a possible pop-out 
mechanism exists for same-directional arrows in a stimulus set. 
However, given the close spatial proximity and perceptual   similarity 
AB
CD
Figure 5 | Traces of the self-terminating search model running in a trial with three left-pointing and two right-pointing arrows, at four different time 
points: cycle 40 (A), cycle 61 (B), cycle 76 (C), and cycle 90 (D). Note that the persistent activity in the IPS layer in the face of incongruity in the sample is mainly 
due to the dynamics generated by increasing k during the trial.
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simulating a self-terminating search algorithm. The two models 
share the same network structure and both are able to perform 
the task. Nevertheless, they involve the function of cognitive 
control differently.
The grouping search model demonstrates how modules simu-
lating different brain functions work together to instantiate cogni-
tive control for the majority function computation. Two critical 
components  of  the  algorithm,  sampling  and  re-sampling,  are 
implemented through Leabra’s built-in kWTA mechanism and 
the joint work of the V4–ACC–LPFC–IPS loop. With k in V4 and 
IPS set to be the respective threshold in each condition, sampling 
is naturally implemented in V4. Because the network weights are 
randomly set, the initial sampling can be random as well. When 
a congruent sample is selected, a response can be quickly gener-
ated. When an incongruent sample is selected, the incongruence 
is detected and re-sampling occurs. More importantly, the model 
shows that cognitive control, important for the detection of incon-
gruence in the selected sample and subserved by a set of neural 
modules, is recruited to modulate re-sampling. The longer RT 
in the 2:1 condition than that in the 5:0 condition, for example, 
is vividly explained by the frequent activations of the ACC and 
LPFC layers and the subsequent extra re-sampling processes in 
the 2:1 condition but the lack of those in the 5:0 condition. These 
results highlight the particular involvement of ACC and LPFC in 
implementing the function of cognitive control in the MFT and 
similar tasks.
It is interesting to note that the grouping search model can be 
revised to implement the self-terminating search, but the resulting 
model fails to fit the human data. The essential change concerns the 
k setting in V4 and IPS layers, which is gradually increased to simu-
late the sequential scanning and counting, a necessary component 
of the self-terminating search. The result that the self-terminating 
model fails to fit the human data to a certain extent provides further 
support for the claim that the grouping search model captures some 
essential constraints of cognitive control in the task. However, it is 
important to note that other models are certainly possible and many 
claims of the grouping search model are open to further experi-
mental investigation. For example, it is possible to implement the 
self-terminating search more literally by fixing the k setting in V4 
and IPS layers to be 1 (rather than gradually increasing it) and add-
ing recurrent connections for both units in the model Output layer 
to achieve evidence accumulation over time as a way of counting. 
By doing so, although the model V4 explicitly samples one item at 
a time, a correct decision can still be made based on the sampling 
history maintained in the model Output layer.
conclusIon
We conclude by arguing that the different involvement of cogni-
tive control differentiates the two models. In the grouping search 
model, the involvement of ACC and LPFC is essential since it is 
the function of these layers that detects conflict and eventually 
triggers and implements the re-sampling. On the contrary, in the 
self-terminating search model, the involvement of the ACC and 
LPFC functions is not required. Taken together, the models dem-
onstrate how cognitive control might be instantiated in the brain 
to support the MFT.
based algorithms, where one can identify and count arrows one-
by-one until a final decision can be made – no congruence judg-
ment is explicitly necessary in these algorithms (Schall, 2001). 
On the other hand, the grouping search algorithm also implies 
that the task performance will be sensitive to the configura-
tion of stimulus set. For those highly incongruent stimulus sets 
(e.g., three left arrows and two right arrows, compared to five 
left arrows), since the probability of selecting an incongruent 
sample is high, the likelihood of re-sampling is high, leading to 
longer reaction times.
A straightforward parallel search model, where all arrows in a 
presented stimulus set are simultaneously selected and processed 
(e.g., via setting k for the V4 and IPS layers to 5 in the five-arrow 
conditions), would presumably predict that all conditions of equal 
stimulus set size (e.g., 3:2, 4:1, and 5:0) have roughly same response 
time (i.e., the Output unit representing the majority will win out 
easily in all conditions). However, it is possible to augment this 
simple parallel search model with a mechanism to quantify the 
incongruence in a parallel fashion. For example, a mutual competi-
tion between two units in the Output layer (via setting its k to 1 in 
the current model) allows increased RTs in response to incongru-
ent stimuli without engaging the whole V4–ACC–LPFC–IPS–V4 
loop (see Gilbert and Shallice, 2002, for an example of incongru-
ent competition in the context of Stroop effect). Neurally, such a 
mutual competition leads to activity normalization between two 
decision units, and neither unit would quickly reach a high deci-
sion threshold for a response (i.e., slow RT in this case) when 
they  are  comparably  activated  (e.g.,  driven  by  equally  salient 
incongruent stimuli), leading to a pattern of RTs as a function 
of signal-to-noise ratio in evidence-based decision-making (e.g., 
Wong et al., 2007; Grossberg and Pilly, 2008). Note that in such a 
model the ACC–LPFC networks can still detect incongruence if 
any, but the effect of such detection could be too late to delay the 
response (i.e., an Output unit may have already fired). To a certain 
extent the grouping model can be regarded as an enhanced ver-
sion of this augmented parallel search model in the sense that in 
the grouping model (1) a subset of stimuli can be simultaneously 
processed; and (2) the sensitivity to signal-to-noise ratio in dif-
ferent conditions is magnified by conflict detection through the 
V4–ACC–LPFC–IPS–V4 loop.
With  advances  in  functional  brain  imaging,  these  claims 
lead  to  further  hypotheses  regarding  possible  brain  activity 
and connectivity to support task performance. While it would 
be necessary to carry out functional brain imaging studies to 
  examine the involvement of these brain areas, it is hard to reveal 
the dynamics of the brain in instantiating the computation. In 
the current study we show that we can study the dynamics of 
majority function computation in the brain by developing bio-
logically realistic computational models of the task. In general 
a biologically plausible computational model that can perform 
the task in similar conditions as humans do and produce results 
that fit the human data provides not only an existence proof 
of the underlying algorithm but also a detailed process-based 
explanation for how the algorithm might be implemented in 
the brain (Marr, 1982; Anderson and Lebiere, 1998; O’Reilly and 
Munakata, 2000; O’Reilly, 2006; McClelland, 2009; Sun, 2009). 
Specifically, we developed two models of MFT performance, 
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